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EDITORIAL NOTES
THE SUMMER LAW ScHooL-The Summer Session of the School of Law for
1923 will open on Thursday, June 14, and close on Friday, August 17, three days
prior to the North Carolina bar examination on Monday, August 20. This Session
has long been devoted to a review of the subjects required by the Supreme Cburt
rules for admission to the bar. The instruction will consist mainly of lectures,
supplemented by assigned readings and quizzes. Two lectures of one and one-half
hours each will be given daily. The summer faculty this year will consist of three
regular members of the law faculty, Professors L. P. McGehee, A. C. McIntosh,
and P. H. Winston, and of Associate Justice W. P. Stacy, of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, and Judge Henry G. Connor, of the United States District
Court for the eastern district of North Carolina.
There are no entrance requirements, except that each student must satisfy
the Dean that his previous training will enable him to pursue the work satisfac-
torily. Examinations will be given as each course is completed. At the end of
the Session certificates will be issued to those passing all examinations. Work
done in the Summer Session may not be counted toward a degree. The tuition
fee for the Summer Session is $30.00 and the registration fee is $5.00.
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The courses to be given are as follows. Dates are inclusive, and the figures in
parentheses indicate the number of lectures in each course.
Torts (10) June 14-25, Professor Winston.
Contracts (15) June 14-30, Professor McIntosh.
Wills (6) June 26-July 3, Professor Winston.
Property (18) July 1-23, Professor McGehee.
Criminal Law (5) July 2-7, Professor McIntosh.
Domestic Relations (5) July 9-14, Professor McIntosh.
Constitutional Law (9) July 17-26, Judge Stacy.
Federal Procedure (2) July 23-24, Judge Connor.
Corporations (8) July 25-August 2, Judge Connor.
Evidence (6) July 27-August 2, Judge Stacy.
Code (13) August 3-17, Judge Stacy.
Equity (12) August 3-17, Judge Connor.
JURISDICTION IN COUNTERCLAIM IN NORTH CAROLINA-Whether a court can
render an affirmative judgment in favor of a defendant upon a counterclaim, the
amount of which is not within the jurisdiction of the court, is a question which
has been discussed in various courts and with somewhat conflicting results. The
differences generally depend upon the constitutional and statutory powers of the
particular court, and upon the different meanings given to the term counterclaim.
In the codes of some of the states a distinction is made between counterclaim
and set-off, and in others the general terrm counterclaim is used.' In North Caro-
lina only the term counterclaim is used,2 and its meaning has been explained to
include recoupment and set-off as well as other cross-demands. "Recoupment" is
a defence arising out of the circumstances constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action, .and it could be used at common law to reduce the plaintiff's claim or to
prevent a recovery, but no judgment could be given to the defendant for any
excess over the plaintiff's claim.3 This is included in the first section of the
counterclaim statute.4
"Set-off" is of statutory origin,5 and allows a defendant, when sued for a
debt, to counterbalance it in whole or in part by setting up as a defence a demand
of his own against the plaintiff. This is included under the second section of the
counterclaim statute.1 Whether a judgment can be rendered for any excess of
defendant's set-off over the plaintiff's claim under the original statute does not
seem to have been generally settled according to any uniform rule of practice;8
1 Pomeroy, Code Remedies, sec. 602.
C. S. see. 519, 521.5 Pomeroy, Code Remedies, sec. 607; Hurst v. Everett (1884) 91 N. C. 399; Electric Co. v. Williams
(1898) 123 N. C. 51. 31 S. E. 288.
4 C. S. sec. 521. "A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the com.
plaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action."
i2 Geo. II, ch. 22; 8 Geo. II, ch. 24; Rev. Stats., ch. 31, sec. 80; Rev. Code (1756) ch. 31, see. 77.
'Pomeroy, Code Remedies, sec. 605, and cases cited in note 3, jupra.
C. S. sec. 521. "In an action arising on contract, any other cause of action also arising on contract,
and existing at the commencement of the action." See cases cited in note 3, iupra.
Spomeroy, Code Remedies, sec. 607; 7 Wait's Actions and Defeuses, 474; 25 A. i E. Encyc. of Law,
2nd ed. 499; 24 R. C. L. 884.
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but it is clearly stated to have been the practice in North Carolina that no such
judgment can be rendered, the set-off being considered only as a defence or cross-
demand to reduce or defeat the plaintiff's recovery.9
"Counterclaim" is the creature of the code, probably derived from the cross-
bill in equity, and is said to be "broader in meaning than set-off, recoupment, or
cross-demand, and includes them all, and secures to the defendant the full relief
which A separate action at law, or a bill in chancery, or a cross-bill would have
secured to him on the same state of facts."' 0 As a matter of pleading, counter-
claim has been distinguished from set-off and recoupment, in that, if relief or
judgment is prayed for against the plaintiff, it is counterclaim; if no judgment or
relief is demanded, it is either set-off or recoupment depending upon the nature
of the claim." This distinction being merely formal, has been abandoned, as will
be seen, and the question now depends upon the nature of the cross-demand and
the jurisdiction of the court in which it is used.' 2 A failure to keep these differ-
ences in meaning clearly distinguished may sometimes lead to confusion and
misunderstanding.13
In courts of limited jurisdiction, as in a court of a justice of the peace where
the jurisdiction in contract is limited to $200, and in tort to $50, questions have
arisen as to whether the court can consider a demand of the defendant, either as
set-off, recoupment, or counterclaim, where the amount involved is beyond the
jurisdiction; and if it can be considered, what disposition can be made of the
claim. The result of these discussions and an explanation of most of the cases
will be found in the opinion of Hoke, J., in the case of Stacey Cheese Co. v.
Pipkin.Y4
In this case the plaintiff sued in a court of a justice of the peace on a con-
tract for $199; the defendant denied the plaintiff's claim, and expressly set up
as a counterclaim, for breach of warranty, an amount beyond the jurisdiction.
The justice gave judgment in favor of the defendant for $38.36, excess over
plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff appealed. Upon a trial de novo in the superior
court, the jury found that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum
of $199, and that plaintiff was indebted to the defendant on the counterclailp in
the sum of $210. The defendant asked for judgment for costs, treating his de-
mand as a set-off or recoupment, and plantiff asked for judgment for the full
amount of his claim, because the defendant's claim was beyond the jurisdiction of
the court in which the action originated. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
for $199, and the defendant's claim was dismissed. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the ruling of the lower court,, and held that the defendant was
9 McClenahan v. Cotten (1880) 83 N. C. 333; Derr v. Stubbs (1880) 83 N. C. 539; Hurst V. Everett
(1884) 91 N. C. 399; Electric Co. v. Williams (1898) 123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288; Cheese Co. v. Pipkin(1911) 155 N. C. 394, 71 S. E. 442, 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 606.
Smith v. French (1906) 141 N. C. 1, 53 S. E. 435; see also Pomeroy, Code Remedies, see. 613;24 R. C. L. 794.
i Hurst v. Everett (1884) 91 N. C. 399.
=Cheese Co. v. Pipkin (1911) 155 N. C. 394, note 9, supra.
134 Cyc. 642.
14 (1911) 155 N. C. 394, 71 S. E. 442, 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 606.
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entitled to a judgment for costs, thereby defeating the plaintiff's recovery, but
that no judgment could be rendered for any excess over the plaintiff's claim. The
result of this decision may be summarized as follows:
1. A justice of the peace cannot render a judgment for any excess of de-
fendant's counterclaim over the plaintiff's demand, when the amount of such
counterclaim exceeds his jurisdiction.
2. The Superior Court, on appeal, has only derivative jurisdiction, and can
render only such judgment as the justice might have rendered.
3. A justice may consider and allow, as recoupment or set-off, a cross-de-
mand of the defendant when the amount is beyond his jurisdiction, so as to defeat
a recovery by the plaintiff.15
4. It is immaterial whether the defendant's demand is called set-off, recoup-
ment, or counterclaim in the pleading, or whether affirmative relief is demanded
or not. If it is a demand which may be pleaded under the statute, judgment
should be rendered thereon, treating it as a counterclaim for affirmative relief
when the amount is within the jurisdiction, and as a defence by way of set-off or
recoupment when beyond the jurisdiction.1
In addition to the above decision, it has been held that the defendant in the
justice's court may remit the excess of his counterclaim over the jurisdictional
amount and recover any excess over the plaintiff's demand ;17 but if this has not
been done in the court below, it may not be done in the Superior Court by way of
amendment on appeal.' 8 The defendant may not, however, use enough of his
counterclaim to balance the plaintiff's demand and then recover judgment upon
the excess of the same or another demand, when the amount is not within the
jurisdiction.19
In Hurst v. Everett,20 where several actions were brought before a justice
upon different notes amounting to $800, the defendant was allowed to set up by
way of recoupment a claim for damages amounting to $400, to be used in each
case until the cross-demand was exhausted. But if defendant should use a claim
beyond the jurisdiction as a set-off, it does not appear to have been definitely set-
tled as to what, if anything, could be done with the balance of the claim. Upon
the doctrine of set-off, as above explained, it would seem that the claim having
been used as a defence could not be used again as the basis of an independent
action. If it could be so used, in what court should the action be brought? If in
a justice's court, it would be allowing the court to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, and would also allow a party to split up his claim and thereby confer
15This overrules the cases of Meneely v. Craven (1882) 86 N. C. 364, and Raisin v. Thomas (1883)
88 N. C. 148, on this point.
IsThis is different from the statement in Hurst v. Everett, supra, note 11, which requires a prayer
for affirmative relief as the test of a counter claim; and also from the rule given in Pomeroy, Code Re..
sec. 624, sug esting that it should be expressly pleaded as a counterclaim and also have a prayer for
affirmative relef.
u2 Heyser v. Gunter (1896) 118 N. C. 964, 24 S. E. 712. This would also seem to fillow from the
statute which allows plaintiff to remit amount over justice's jurisdiction. C. S. acc. 1475.
13 ljames v. McClamroch (1885) 92 N. C. 362.
"Electric Co. v. Williams (1898) 123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288.
- (1884) 91 N. C. 399.
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jurisdiction.21 If the defendant is compelled to submit to a judgment upon the
plaintiff's demand, and bring an independent action in another court to enforce
his claim, he might be compelled to pay the plaintiff's judgment in the meantime,
and afterwards be unable to enforce his judgment against the plaintiff. To meet
this difficulty, it has been intimated that the defendant might restrain the enforce-
ment of the plaintiff's judgment until he could obtain a judgment and then set off
one against the other, as in the old equity practice. 22 Such a proceeding would
not be in keeping with the spirit of the modern practice which seeks to prevent
multiplicity of suits and to avoid circuity of action. With the construction of the
constitutional limitation of the justice's jurisdiction, this difficulty could not be
remedied without a change in the Constitution, unless the rule could be adopted,
that when the court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim it has incidental
jurisdiction over the defendant's claim. This, however, would overrule the de-
cisions already referred to, and would allow a court of limited jurisdiction to
render an affirmative judgment upon a counterclaim for an amount beyond its
jurisdiction. This might not be an unmitigated evil, if it could be done, since in
determining the set-off as a defence, the court necessarily determines the validity
of the whole claim, but can proceed only half way in rendering a judgment. 23
In the Superior Court, as a court of general jurisdiction, the power to render
a judgment upon a counterclaim, the amount of which is below the jurisdiction
and upon which an independent action could not have been brought in such court,
was directly decidqd in the recent case of Sewing Machine Co. v. Burger.24 The
plaintiff's action was in the nature of a foreclosure of a mortgage to secure a debt
of $37, and the Superior Court had jurisdiction. The defendant denied .the plain-
tiff's claim and set up a counterclaim, arising out of contract, for $193. The jury
assessed the plaintiff's debt at $37, and the defendant's counterclaim at $108, and
the court gave judgment for the defendant for the excess, $71 and costs. On
appeal the Supreme Court sustained the action of the lower court. The leading
opinion was by Stacy, J., with a concurring opinion by Clark, C. J., while Allen,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, which was concurred in by Walker, J.
The question does not appear to have been so directly presented before. There
had been, of course, many cases of counterclaim in the Superior Court, but an
examination of the cases will show that in most of these either the court had
jurisdiction of the amount claimed or it was allowed only as a set-off or recoup-
ment. In Wilson v. Hughes,2 5 the defendant's counterclaim was for $75, and
judgment was rendered thereon for $5, but under the facts of the case the claim
could have been considered in tort as well as in contract, and the court would then
have hlad jurisdiction. In Wiggins v. Guthrie,26 the defendant's counterclaim was
21 Jarrett v. Self (1884) 90 N. C. 478.
" Love v. Rhyne (1882) 86 N. C. 576; Raisin v. Thomas (1883) 88 N. C. 148.
For a discussion generally as to courts of limited jurisdiction, see Ann. Cas. 1913D 158 and note;
37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 606 and note.
24 (1921) 181 N. C. 241, 107 S. E. 14.
"(188,6) 94 N. C. 182.
10 (1888) 101 N. C. 661, 7 S. E. 761.
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in contract and- under $200, and the court ruled that it could not be allowed as a
counterclaim, because not within the jurisdiction, but did allow it as set-off or
recoupment. On appeal, the Supreme Court said: "This accorded to defendant
all the benefit to which he was entitled, and he should be content in being allowed
to use it for that purpose." Since no affirmative judgment could have been rend-
ered for the defendant upon the facts presented, this case is not necessarily de-
cisive of the question. These and numerous other cases are discussed in the opin-
ions in the principal case.
The case in question decides that the Superior Court may render an affirm-
ative judgment upon a counterclaim, the amount of which could not be the sub-
ject of an independent action in such court. The basis of the decision is, not that
the court can render a judgment upon a claim not within its jurisdiction, but that
the court has jurisdiction in cases of this kind. This view would seem to be in
conflict with the general meaning of counterclaim as expressed in some former
decisions. "A counterclaim is a distinct and independent cause of action, and
when properly stated as such with a prayer for relief, the defendant becomes in
respect to the matters alleged by him an actor; and there are really two simul-
taneous actions pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same
time both a plaintiff and a defendant." 2" "A true counterclaim . . . to be
capable of affirmative relief, must be one on which judgment might be had in the
action, and must therefore come within the jurisdiction of the court wherein it is
pleaded." 28
The result reached by the majority opinion is satisfactory, however, as a rule
of procedure, and to take the opposite view would leave the matter in the same
confusion that now exists in connection with the courts of limited jurisdiction.
Some of the arguments advanced for the decision may not be entirely satisfactory,
as is shown by a dissenting opinion, or may apply equally to cases in the lower
courts. That the Superior Court, as a court of general jurisdiction, having juris-
diction over the plaintiff's cause of action, has also incidental jurisdiction over
the defendant's counterclaim, is in conflict with the meaning of counterclaim as
above defined. That the code does not fix any limit upon the amount of the
counterclaim, and therefore the amount is immaterial in the Superior Court, might
apply also to a court of a justice of the peace, since substantially the same words
are used in authorizing a plea of counterclaim. 29 While the Constitution ex-
pressly limits the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, it does not now make it
exclusive, and no limitation is placed upon the Superior Court; but the Constitu-
tion also provides that the legislature may distribute the jurisdiction which does
not pertain to the Supreme Court among other courts,80 and this has been done by
enacting that justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction in contract not
=Francis v. Edwards (1877) 77 N. C. 271; Garrett v. Love (1883) 89 N. C. 205.
/Electric Co. v. Willams (1898) 123 N. C. 51 31 S E. 288; Askew v. Koonce (1896) 118 N. C. 526,
24 S. E. 218; Turner v. Livestock Co. (1920) 179 R. C. 457, 102 S. E. 849. Jurisdiction would necessarily
be one element of the cause of action.
C. S. sec. 1500, Rule 3. The answer may contain ". . . a statement in a plain and direct man.
ner, of any facts constituting a .defence or counterclaim."
0GConst. Art. 4, sec. 12.
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exceeding $200,31 and that the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of all civil
actions whereof exclusive original jurisdiction is not given to some other court.32
The argument from inconvenience in failing to recognize the power of the court
to render judgment in such cases, applies with equal force to the lower courts.
These objections are presented in the dissenting opinion.
The strongest reason upon which the decision is based, and upon which it
may be readily accepted as correct, is that the Superior Court has jurisdiction in
such cases upon a proper construction of the counterclaim statutes, and upon the
statutory power to render judgments.33 These sections have been cited and ex-
plained in the opinions of the court. Section 588 of' the Consolidated Statutes,
however, is not referred to, although it must have been considered. This section
provides, among other things, that "if a counterclaim, established at the trial,
excceeds the plaintiff's demand so established, judgment for the defendant must be
given for the excess; or if it appears that the defendant is entitled to any other
affirmative relief, judgment must be given accordingly." This carries out the plan
of the code, that the Superior Court may render such judgment as is necessary to
do justice between the parties in administering both law and equity, and expressly
requires a judgment for the defendant for the excess of his counterclaim. This
power is not extended to a justice of the peace.
These decisions fix the rule of practice in North Carolina in accordance with
the practice declared to exist in other jurisdictions. In a court of limited juris-
diction, the defendant may use his demand as set-off or recoupment to defeat or
reduce the plaintiff's demand, but he cannot obtain an affirmative judgment upon
his counterclaim, when the amount exceeds the jurisdiction. In a court of general
jurisdiction, judgment may be rendered for the excess of defendant's claim, al-
though no original action could have been brought thereoil in such court.3 4
A. C. McI.
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IN NORTH CARoLINA-The privilege of a creditor
to subject the person of his debtor to imprisonment as a means of coercing pay-
ment was recognized by the North Carolina colonial statutes. These statutes
dealt mainly with the methods by which an imprisoned debtor might be freed,
through the taking of an insolvent debtor's oath and a surrender of what property
he had for the benefit of his creditors. The Constitution of 1776 declared "That
the person of a debtor, where there is not a strong presumption of fraud, shall
not be continued in prison after delivering up, bond fide, all his estate, real and
personal, for the use of his creditors, in such a manner as shall hereafter be regu-
n C. S. sec. 1473.
UC. S. see. 1436.
C. . se. 521, 602.
"This is the rule stated in 15 Corpus Jurs 774 but the cases there cited which seem most clearly to
sustain the rule depend upon the construction of local statutes as in the principal case. These are Howuard
Iron Works v. Bufalo Elec. Co. (1903) 176 N. Y. 1, 68 N. K. 66 and Garrett v. Robinson (1900) 93 Tex.
406, 55 S..W. 564. The case of Griswold v. Pierat (1895) 110 al. 259, 42 Pac. 820, which is also cited
and discussed in the principal case, seems to hold contrary to the rule as stated.
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lated by law." 1  The questions that arose under this provision were principally
concerned with the construction of the various insolvent debtor's acts enacted
by the General Assembly.2
In 1867, however, due to the conditions existing as a result of the war be-
tween the states, the legislature abolished imprisonment for debt altogether.3 And
in the next year, the new Constitution of 1868 provided that "There shall be no
imprisonment for debt in this state, except in cases of fraud."' 4
Under this provision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has had to con-
strue the terms "debt" and "cases of fraud." Before going into these problems,
however, three more general consequences of the abolition of imprisonment for
debt should be noticed. In the first place, it operated to enlarge and liberalize the
equity jurisdiction of our courts in connection with supplemental proceedings by
judgment creditors to subject their debtors' legal choses in action toward payment
of the judgment, after execution returned mnlla bona.5 In the second place, it
deprived the courts of power in equitable proceedings to send a judgment debtor
to jail for disobedience of an order to pay the debt by a day certain.6 Otherwise,
the debtor's predicament would be worse than before the abolition of imprison-
ment for debt, when he could take advantage of the insolvent debtor's acts to to
escape confinement. Finally, the arrest and imprisonment of a debtor, particularly
when the creditor thus seeks to reach property exempt from execution, may be
made the basis of an action for damages for malicious abuse of process.7
What the Constitution sought to prohibit was the imprisonment of one who
had done nothing more reprehensible than to fail to pay a sum of money owing
under a contract. It did not seek to extend immunity from arrest to one who
had committed an offense such as a tort, a contempt, or a crime, or to one who
had breached a duty imposed by law for the protection of the public. In other
words, the 'term "debt" as used in the Constitution has reference only to an
obligation arising ex contractu. It does not embrace a duty to pay money arising
ex delicto. Thus it has been held that the Constitution does not prohibit the arrest
and imprisonment of the defendant in actions for libel,8 seduction,9 or conver-
sion.10 In bastardy cases, 1 1 the father may be imprisoned for refusing to give
bond for the support of the child, or for failure to meet his payments under the
bond. This obligation is something more than a debt; the duty is imposed to
I N. C. Const. 1776, sec. 39.
2 Burton v. Dickens (1819) 7 N. C. 103; Jordan v. Marshall (1824) 10 N. C. 110; Crain v. Long (1832)
14 N. C. 371; State v. Manuel (1838) 20 N. C. 144, 153; Williams v. Floyd (1845) 27 N. C. 649; Griffin
v. Simmons (1857) 50 N. C 146.
sp. L. 1866-67, ch. 3.
4 N. C. Const. 1868, art. 1, sec. 16.
5 Po oell v. Howell and Bridgers (1869) 63 N. C. 283.
oDaniel v. Owen (1875) 72 N. C. 340. See Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 Col. L. R. 37, 116.
1 Lockhart v. Bear (1895) 117 N. C. 298, 23 S. E. 484.
$Moore v. Green (1875) 73 N. C. 394, 21 Am. Rep. 470.
'Hoover v. Palmer (1879) 80 N. C. 313; Kinney v. Laughenour (1887) 97 N. C. 325, 327, 2 S. E. 43.
10 Long v. McLean (1883) 88 N. C. 3.
U State v. Pain (1869) 63 N. C. 471; Wooding v. Green (1874) 71 N. C. 172; State v. Beasley (1876)
75 N. C. 211; State v. Giles (1889) 103 N. C. 391, 9 S. E. 433; State v. Burton (1893) 113 N. C. 655, 18
S. E. 657; State v. Wynne (1895) 116 N. C. 981, 21 S. E. 35; State v. Morgan (1906) 141 N. C. 726, 53
S. E. 142.
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prevent the child from becoming a public charge. Similarly, an award of alimony
in a divorce decree is based upon the husband's common law duty to support the
wife, and is not a debt within the constitutional sense of the term.12 Nor are
the fine and costs, 13 levied for a violation of the criminal law.14 For these con-
stitute a punishment. On the other hand, it has been said that a penalty inflicted
by a municipal ordinance for a violation of its provisions is a debt within the
meaning of the Constitution, so as to prevent the imprisonment of the defaulting
offender. 15 This is hard to square with the notion that the debt must be one aris-
ing ex contractu.
To bring a case within the phrase "except in cases of fraud," the element of
fraud, either in the creation of the debt or in evasion of its collection, must be
alleged in the pleadings, submitted to the jury as an issue, established by the
verdict, and recited in the judgment.16 The court has wisely refrained, however,
from attempting a precise definition of just what will constitute fraud. Where,
however, an agent converted to his own use a sum of money collected for his
principal,' 1 or a person obtained credit or an advance by means of knowingly false
representations,' 8 or a debtor conveyed property in violation of the rights of
creditors, 19 the conduct has been held fraudulent so as to permit of the offender's
arrest and imprisonment. But the court has been unable to find fraud where noth-
ing else appeared except the fact of a mere breach of promise to marry,20 an un-
explained failure of an administrator to pay over allotments to distributees,21 or
a simple breach of promise to begin work given as consideration for an advance.22
In this connection, the recent North Carolina case of Minton v. Early23 is of in-
terest. A statute authorized the arrest and imprisonment of a tenant for abandoning
the crop without reimbursing the landlord for advancements. Because it did not
require any allegation or proof of fraud, either in the inception or breach of the
contract, the statute was held unconstitutional. The offense contemplated
amounted to nothing more than a mere failure to perform a promise, and the
exception to the constitutional immunity from imprisonment was not applicable.2 4
M. R. K.
2'Pain v. Pain (1879) 80 N. C. 322. See'7 Minn. L. Rev. 407.
13 State v. Manuel (1838) 20 N. C. 144; Neighbors v. Hamlin (1878) 78 IT. C. 42.
14 Compare State v. Wallin (1883) 89 N. C. 578.
'aState v. Earnhart (1890) 107 N. C. 789, 12 S. E. 426. The statement was a dictum. See Vance v.
Henderson (1900) 126 N. C. 689, 35 S. E. 228.
1 Claflin & Co. v. Underwood (1876) 75 N. C. 485; Steward v. Bryan (1897) 121 N. C. 46, 28 S, E.
18; Ledford v. Emerson (1906) 143 N. C. 527, 55 S. E. 969.
ITliowers v. Davenport (1888) 101 N. C. 286, 7 S. E. 747.
11 Walton v. Haynes (1877) 76 N. C. 122; State v. Torrence (1900) 127 N. C. 550, 37 S. E. 268. The
finding of fraud in the latter case is questionable.
"Preiss v. Cohen (1895) 117 N. C. 54, 23 S. E. 162.
2OMoore v. Mullen (1877) 77 N. C. 327. Had the element of seduction been present the court would
probably have held otherwise.
IdMelV.n v. Melvin (1875) 72 N. C. 384.
02 State v. Norman (1892) 110 N. C. 484, 14 S. E. 968.
(1922) 183 N. C. 199. 111 S. E. 347. See also State v. Williams (1909) 150 N. C. 802, 63 S. E.
949; State. v. Griffin (1911) 134 N. C. 611, 70 S. E. 292, 21 L. R. A. (n. s.) 242, and note.
36For the present insolvent debtor's act see C. S. ch. 28.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
PRIORITY BETWEEN HUSBANDS CREDITORS AND WIFE'S RIGHT TO REFORM-
ATION OF DEE---In the recent case of Spence v. Foster Pottery Co.' the Supreme
Court of North Carolina sustained a suit by a wife to reform a deed made by a
third person to her husband, which had been acknowledged and recorded more
than fifteen years before. The deed was reformed by inserting the wife's name
as a grantee with the husband upon parol evidence that she furnished half the
purchase money amounting to over thirteen thousand dollars. Land which for
this long period had appeared of record as his several property was thereby con-
verted into an estate by the entireties, and the intervening claims of the husband's
creditors, founded on judgments duly docketed before the wife's' discovery of the
original mistake in drafting the deed, were defeated. A similar case, decided
several years before the making of the deed in the instant case, appeared con-
clusive of the points involved,2 unless the court was prepared to reconsider a pre-
cedent of so many years standing.
The result of the decision is that a virtual homestead or life exemption was
secured to the husband in nearly $7,000 of his own property and in a like amount
of his wife's property, as against creditors of the husband with docketed judg-
ments for more than $6,000, who acted with diligence in examining the records
and credited him on the strength of facts there appearing. The hardship of the
case makes worth while an attempt at an impartial review of the authorities.
Conceding the wife to be entitled to relief, her property rights would have
been amply protected, by a decree establishing the husband and wife as cotenants.
Had such a course seemed possible in other respects, however, it was not open to
the court in view of the prior case cited above. The wife asserted and established
an estate by entireties, and she was entitled to it so long as the courts recognize
that survival from a state of society which has long ceased to exist. This estate
for hundreds of years was in harmony with-the legal and popular conceptions of
the relation of husband and wife3 and was not a just object of criticism. But the
relation of husband and wife has been revolutionized by the spirit of the times
and by statutes which have vested married women with new privileges and obli-
gations. And in the present state of the law, the observation of Chief Justice
Clark that the estate by entireties exists merely because the legislature has for-
gotten to change it to a cotenancy4 is hardly too strong. Had this estate been
abolished, the decree in the principal case could have been framed, even had re-
formation been allowed, so as "to render to each that which was his own." Per-
haps sewing new cloth on old garments is a necessary evil now; the necessity
might have been obviated a generation ago.
i Decided April, 1923. 117 S. E. 32. Stacy, J., wrote the principal opinion. Chief Justice Clark
dissented.
3Ray I. Long (1901) 128 N. C. 90, 38 S. E. 290; 5. C. (1903) 132 N. C. 891, 44 S. E. 652.
sIt seems founded on the same common law principle which after marriage gave the husband an
estate e f jre urori in his wife's land; namely, that he who has the rents and profts of land ha a cou.
mensurable freehold therein. Bilder v. Robnson (1907) 73 N. 3. Eq. 169, 67 Atl. 828. See Paramour
v. Yardley. Plow. 542. But see the vigorous characterization by Clark, C. 3. dissenting, in Freeman
v. Belfer (1917) 173 N. C. 581, at p. 589, 92 S. E. 486: "The obscure and utterly unknown judge who in
the remote past evolved the doctrine of entireties out of, his own consciousness."
'Bynum v. Wicker (1906) 141 N. C. 95, 53 S. E. 478.
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The creditors interposed two defences, the statute of limitations and the reg-
istration acts. It seems clear that the statute of limitations invoked could not aid
the creditors5 unless it appeared that the wife ought to have discovered the facts
as to the state of the title at an earlier date.6 For it might well have been con-
tended that she was chargeable with negligence and laches for not discovering the
error sooner.
The registration act,7 as the court points out, by its term at least, had no bear-
ing on the case. It provides that three classes of instruments, namely: convey-
ances, contracts to convey, and certain leases shall not be effective before regis-
tration, as against bona fide purchasers and creditors. Here the contest was as
to the priority of docketed judgments and an equity to have a registered deed re-
formed. The statute has never been held to make a registered deed absolutely con-
clusive as against such equities. For instance, if the wife had discovered the mis-
take or inadvertence the day after the registration of the deed and bad begun the
suit at once, no one would have doubted her right to reformation. If the judg-
ments were to have priority, it must have been because the case for reformation
was not meritorious in the view of a court of equity. In other words the'decision
must turn, in the words of the court, not "on the terms of the Connor Act, but on
the broad principles of equity." But the purpose of the Connor Act, in such a case,
may well be an important consideration in balancing the equities of the opposing
parties.8 One of the purposes of all acts requiring record of various classes of
instruments, deeds, judgments, etc., is to protect those dealing with property on
the strength of the records. When a question of priority between inconsistent
claims arises, and one of the parties has carefully acted on the security held out
by the state to registered instruments while the other has omitted to see to it that
the records indicate his claim, this fact may well be considered by the court of
equity as inclining the balance in favor of the recorded title. This seems to be
all that is meant by courts which base on the registration laws the preference of
the recorded claims of creditors over the merely equitable claims of a wife to
reformation, for such cases always invoke the wife's laches or negligence as a
controlling factor. A strong expression of such an appeal to registry laws is
subjoined from a Connecticut case.0
a C. S. sec. 445, the ten year statute relating to "an action for relief not herein provided for." This
case, however, is "herein provided for." C. S. see. 442(9) declares that causes of action for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake are not barred until three years after the discovery of the fraud or mistake,
and the wife's case is that the mistake or inadvertence of the draftsman had been known only a few months.
e The statute runs from the time when the party discovered the facts "or could have discovered them
by the exercise of proper effort and reasonable care." Modlin V. R. R. Co. (1907) 145 N. C. 218, 58
S. E. 1075.
T C: S. sec. 3309, known as the "Connor Act."
8 See Door Co. v. Joyner (1921) 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259.
9 In Goldberg v. Parker (1913) 87 Conn. 99, 87 At. 555, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 1059, the court in holding
a wife equitably estopped to obtain reformation as against creditors, says: "Any other holding would do
violence .to the faith which, time out of mind we have given to our registry laws. With inflexible ad-
herence we have made every title to land, so far as practicable, Appear of record. We have held the record
constructive notice to all the world of land titles. We have authorized reliance to be placed thereon. We
have sustained contracts and conveyances made upon their faith. We cannot hold that a credit extended
in reliance upon the land records, must yield to the equitable owner of the title without doing irreparable
injury to the registry laws and going counter to our decisions. The maintenane of our system of registry
of tites is of the greatest public importance, and he who acts in reliance upon the record has behind him
not only the natural equities of his position, but also the especial equity arising from the protection afforded
everyone who trusts the record."
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The circumstances to be weighed in determining the priority of such con-
flicting claims include: the wife's conduct in not ascertaining for so long the true
state of facts as to the title; the element of estoppel introduced by the creditors
advancing money on the strength of the recorded deed; and the notice or absence
of notice to the creditors of the wife's equity. There must be some constructive
fraud, laches, or negligence on the part of the plaintiff to defeat the claim for re-
formation. Mere failure to detect the error in the instrument, continued for a
long period, has, it seems, been considered sufficient in itself, in some cases; but
combined, as it usually is with other elements in the case, it may become con-
clusive. 10 Nor would the mere fact that the creditors have in the exercise of due
care advanced money on the strength of the record title aid them as against the
wife unless some fault can be brought home to her, and if such fault exists, it
must be found in the wife's permitting her husband for so long to appear as
record owner in possession of the property.
"Where the true owner of property, for however short a time allows another to appear,
as the owner of or as having full power of disposition over the property, the same being in
the latter's actual possession, and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such
apparent owner, they will be protected. Or when others are innocently induced to acquire
rights in derogation of the secret or undisclosed claims of those who cause such action, the
rights so acquired are secure whether contested at law or in equity."'"
The principle thus stated has been applied to circumstances such as existed'
in the instant case. 1
2
On the question of notice from possession the general doctrine is that if the
husband was in possession under a recorded conveyance, the creditors were with-
out notice of the wife's equity.' 8 But the cases are not uniform, and the court
adopts the apparently indefensible rule, without distinction between recorded and
unrecorded titles, that the husband's possession is the wife's possession when they
are living together.
It thus appears that the creditors at every step acted with care and diligence
in reliance upon record title, and that on principle and authority they were not
chargeable with even constructive notice of the wife's equity; that the wife for
20 Clark, Principles of Equity, sec. 356.
11 Bigelow, Estoppel, 6th ed., 607. McNeil v. Tenth Natl. Bank (1871) 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 341.
Mayo v. Leggctt (1887) 96 N. C. 242, 1 S. E. 622 (citing above passage from Bigelow, but distinguishing
case on ground that owner of equity had done nothing by word or act to mislead the other party).
12Morgan v. Lewis (1916) 172 Ky. 813, 189 S. W. 1118. "If the wife paid the consideration for the
deed . . . she then permitted her husband to appear to be the owner of the land and thereby invested
him with a false credit . . . while equity has leaned and no doubt will continue to lean toward the
enforcement of such trusts between husband and wife, as [well] as between the latter and others posses.
sing no intervening rights, it has not nor will it recognize such trusts or enforce them as against those who
have [obtained rights upom the false credit] which the acquiescence of the wife has permitted to appear."
See Farmers" Oil etc. Co. v. Hnsten (1917) 125 Ark. 280, 192 S. W. 890; Mitchell v. Liberty Saving, etc.
Corp. (1922) 28 Ga. App. 408, 111 S. E. 215; Kriteger v. McDounqald (1918) 22 Ga. 429, 96 S. E. 867 (effect
of wife's negligent omission to inform herself raised but not decided in view of other elements of estoppel);
Chanev v. Gould Co. (1915) 28 Idaho 76, 152 Pac. 468. said to be inapplicable where wife neither knew nor
should have known that title in husband; McKoclatn v. Vohncr Clear.fVater Co. (1917) 30 Idaho 505, 166
Pac. 256.
Contra: Zeigler v. Zeigler (1913) 180 Ala. 246 60 So 810, deed to husband reformed after 28 years,
it appearing that he always recognized her right. gee also authorities pro and con in note in Ann Cas.
1914 C 1066.
13 Kirby v. Tallmadge (1896) 160 U. S. 384, 16 Sup. Ct. 349. 40 L. Ed. 466, where it is said that if
land is occupied by husband and wife and there is a recorded title in one of them, such joint occupation
is no notice of an unrecorded title in the other. "The rule is universal, if possession is consistent with
the record title, it is not notice of an unrecorded title," citing 2 Por. Eq. sec. 616. where the principle
as generally held is approved and said to be "in perfect harmony with sound principle."
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a prolonged period pursued such a course of conduct in not ascertaining the facts
relating to the title, as to make it possible for the husband to appear with a false
credit, thereby occasioning loss to innocent third parties. The better view there-
fore seems to us to be, at least in the present status of married women's property
rights and the obligations which should accompany them, that her conduct amounts
to laches and negligence and should bar her suit in equity.
Finally the preference of the creditor's claims would seem to follow from "the
simple and just principle" that "when one of two parties must suffer by the fraud
or misconduct of a third person, he who first reposed a confidence, or by his
negligent conduct made it possible for the loss to occur, must bear the loss."'1 4
L. P. McG.
CRIMINAL ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH AN AUTOMOBILE-Common law
definitions of criminal assault and battery always assume the presence of wilfull-
ness, or some equivalent, as an essential element of the crime. "An assault is an
intentional attempt, by violence, to do injury to the person of another. It must be
intentional . . . a present purpose to do an injury."' There is no assault if
the circumstances show that there is not a present purpose to do an injury, as in
the cases where the defendant declares his intention in such a manner as to explain
away an apparent assault.2 Ordinarily an act which begins as an assault ends as
a battery and merges in it, and so it is said that a battery always includes an
assault,3 although the crime of assault may be complete without a battery. A bat-
tery is an injury done to the person of another, no matter how slight the force may
be, if done in an angry, rude or hostile manner. Thus riding at a person is an
assault, riding against him is a battery.
By statute, in the United States and England, various grades of criminal
assault and battery have been established, depending upon the particular criminal
intent actuating the wrongdoer. Thus we have assault with intent to murder,
assault with intent to rob, assault with deadly weapon with intent to kill, 4 assault
with intent to mainif etc. Where a specific criminal intent is made an element of
the statutory offense, it must be alleged in the indictment and proved.
While no specific intent is required in simple assault and battery, there must
be a general criminal intent, variously described as "intent to injure," "intent to
commit personal violence," "intent to do harm," etc. "If there is no present pur-
pose to do an injury, there is no assault . . . The intention as well as the act
4 Lickbarrow v. Mason (1787) 2 T. R. 63, 70: "Wherever one of two innocent parties must suffer
by the act of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it." Wil.
mington, etc. R. Co. v. Kitchin (1884) 91 N. C. 39; Hav.e,zs v. Bank (1903) 132 N. C. 214, 43 S. E. 639.
'Stat v. Davis (1840) 23 N. C. 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735.
2 In State v. Crow (1841) 23 N. C. 375, the defendant raised a whip and said, "If you were not an
old man, I would knock you down." This is not an assault, since there is no present purpose to do harm.
Compare State v. Morgan (1842) 25 N. C. 186 38 Am. Dec. 714, where the defendant raised an axe in
position to strike and said, "Give up the gun or I'll split you down.' This was held to be an assault.
3State v. Snddcreth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828. This statement is found in Coke on
Littleton, p. 253.
4 Consolidated Statutes, North Carolina (cited as C. S.) sec. 4214.
rC. S. sec. 4210-11-12.
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makes the assault." 6  This general criminal intent, which is an element of every
assault and battery, may be inferred from circumstances constituting criminal
negligence, 7 but may not be inferred from mere violation of an ordinance or
statute, unless the violation of the statute is the legal equivalent of negligence. 8
This is not to be confused with the doctrine of constructive intent, where the de-
fendant intends to do one criminal act and in fact does another. In such cases, it
is held that if the intention is to violate an ordinance or statute of the class known
as malum pro-hibitum, i.e., crimes which require no specific intent, and if an un-
expected result happens entirely without negligence, the wrongdoer cannot be held
criminally, because there is no criminal intent to carry over to the injury actually
resulting. 9
It is true that most of the cases of criminal assault and battery with an auto-
mobile have been cases where there was some statutory violation in conjunction
with negligence.' 0 The courts have spoken as if this violation constitutes the wil-
ful act which imputes a criminal intent. 1 But there seems to be no reason for dis-
tinguishing negligent acts of commission, such as violations of statutory provis-
ions, from negligent acts of omission. "There is little distinction except in degree
between a will to do a wrongful thing and an indifference whether it is done or
not. Therefore carelessness is criminal and within limits supplies the place of an
affirmative criminal intent."' 2
Suppose the defendant, without direct intent to injure anyone, drives an auto-
mobile negligently and runs into another person. If the victim dies, he is guilty
of manslaughter. If.the victim lives, and.if the law is to be developed to'meet the
changing conditions of our complex civilization, as well as with logic and sym-
metry, criminal responsibility, though of a lesser degree, must still attach to his
act. It can be no other crime at common law except assault and battery, since the
law has not split personal injuries into two degrees of offense, as in homicide.1 3
Or we may say that the advent of the automobile has compelled the law to recog-
nize a new crime of negligent assault and battery.
The negligence, which will sustain criminal responsibility in these cases, is
something more than is required in a civil action. It has been termed "gross" neg-
• State v. Hemphill (1913) 162 N. C. 632, 78 S. E. 167.
State v. Suddereth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828 and the cases of assault and battery with an
automobile cited herein. See also State v. Monroe (1897) 121 N. C. 677, 28 S. E. 547.
5 See note on Public Wrong and Private Action in North Carolina, 1 N. C. L. Rev. 192, where the
author points out that the violation of a statute which sets up a standard of conduct is not properly negli.
gence, or evidence of negligence, but amounts to the legal equivalent of negligence.
9 Con. v. Adams (1873) 114 Mass. 323, 19 Am. Rep. 362. This was an indictment of assault and bat.
tery for running into a boy with a sleigh which was being driven in violation of a city ordinance. No
question of negligence was considered, and it was held that the intent to violate the ordinance could not
supply the intent necessary to sustain the. charge of assault and battery, but that to supply the intent neces.
sary for an unexpected assault the defendant must be engaged in an act malign in .c. See State v. Horton
(1905) 139 N. C. 588, 51 S. . 945.
" State v. Suddereth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828; State v. Schutte (1915) 87 N. J. L. 15, 93
At. 112; s. c. affirmed 88 N. J. L.. 396, 96 Atl. 659; Luther v. State (1912) 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E. 640;
Schneider v. State (1914) 181 Ind. 218, 104 N. E. 69; Bleiweiss v. State (1918) 188 Ind. 184, 119 N. E.
375 s. c. 122 N. E. 577; State v. Miller (Mo. 1921) 234 S. W. 813; Tilt v. State (1916) 17 Ga. App. 663 88
S. E. 41; People v. Hopper (Colo. 1917) 169 Pac. 152; Fishwiek v. State (1911) 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. 63; don.
v. Bergdoll (1913) 55 Pa. Super. Ct. 186; Corn. v. Coccodralli (1921) 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 324.
UState v. Schutte (1915) 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 At. 112; Luther v. State (1912) 177 Ind. 619, 98 N. E.640.
11 Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 313.
"2 See note in 13 Mich. L. R. 594 on Negligent Assault and Battery.
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ligence, but the term is misleading and is based on the idea of degrees of negli-
gence. Criminal negligence means recklessness. It is such recklessness or care-
lessness as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indiffer-
ence to the safety and rights of others. As -the North Carolina Supreme Court
said in regard to the negligence necessary to sustain a conviction of manslaughter
in case of an unintentional killing, "It is such recklessness or carelessness as is
incompatible with a proper regard for human life."1 4  That the same standard
should apply in cases of negligent assault and battery is evident.. The North Caro-
lina court has laid down the following rule which should meet with universal ap-
proval: "Where the facts of a case of homicide constitute the crime of man-
slaughter, the same state of facts will make an assault if no killing ensues,
' 15
In the New Jersey case of State v. Schutte,16 there was a conviction of
assault and battery by "wilfully and unlawfully" striking and wounding another
with an automobile, which was being driven at an excessive rate of speed, in vio-
lation of statute. It was argued that "both the wilful wrongdoing that constitutes
malice in the law and also an intention to inflict injury are of the essence of crim-
inal assault; and that, as a necessary corollary, mere negligence will not sustain a
conviction for such crime." The court agreed with these abstract propositions,
"provided it be borne in mind that the necessary malice may be implied from the
doing of an unlawful thing from which injury is reasonably to be apprehended and
also that an intention to injure need not be specifically directed to the particular in-
dividual that was injured, but may be inferred in law from the consequences that
are naturally to be apprehended as the result of the particular act, the doing of
which was intentional." The decision does not appear to be based on negligence,
but holds that the driving of an automobile at an excessive rate of speed is a wilful
act, likely to result in injury, and malice and intention to inflict injury, which are
essentials of criminal assault, may be implied, if the circumstances so warrant.
For instance, the court says, "The running of a car at a high rate of speed is an
act in which the will of the driver concurs, and hence is clearly a willful act as
distinguished from merely negligent conduct, when considered with respect to the
state of mind of the offender, which is what the criminal law considers
It requires neither argument or illustration to show that the excessive rate of speed
at which an automobile is driven is a product of the will of its driver and not the
result of his mere inattention or negligence. The two cannot be confused any
more than the hurling of a baseball bat into a crowd of spectators could be con-
fused with its accidentally slipping from the hand of the batter."'17 This case was
affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals' 8 for the reasons stated in the opinion
of the Supreme Court, but the appellate court was afraid that the decision might
itState v. Rountree (1921) 181 N. C. 535, 106 S. E. 669; State v. Mclver (1918) 175 N. C. 761, 945. E. 682.
25State v. Suddereth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 755 114 S E 828; State v. Leary (1883) 88 N. C. 615,
617; State v. Dula (1888) 100 N. C. 423, 428, 6 s. 2. 89.
18 State v. Schutte (1915) 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 At!. 112.
37 What if the slipping of the bat from the batter's hands could be attributed to his recklessness in
handling it?
18 State v. Schutte (1916) 88 N. 3. L. 396, 96 At. 659.
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leave the impression that proof of excessive speed alone would sustain a conviction
of assault and battery. So it said that exceeding the speed limit is not the con-
trolling factor but is to be considered in deciding whether or not the defendant
was running his automobile at a rate of speed, which, under the existing conditions,
was obviously dangerous to pedestrians and others using the highway; i.e. whether,
in other words, the defendant is guilty of criminal negligence.
In a recent North Carolina case, 19 there was a collision between the defend-
ant's car and the car of the prosecutor. The jury found that the defendant was
running his car at an excessive speed in violation of statutory provisions2" de-
signed to secure the safety of persons on the highways and enacted to prevent
death or serious bodily harm. The court held that where one upon the highway
is killed or injured by reason of the operation of an automobile in violation of the
statutory provisions, the party in default may be prosecuted for murder or man-
slaughter if death ensues and for assault in case of personal injury. The statute
in question sets up a standard of conduct, and the common law attaches to the
violation of this legislative standard the same legal consequences that flow from
a breach of the common law standard of criminal negligence. 2I Thus the North
Carolina court makes responsibility depend on criminal negligence, which is, in
every way, better than trying to imply malice or wilfulness from the performance
of an unlawful act. Further, the North Carolina rule, as stated above, that "where
the facts of a case of homicide constitute the crime of manslaughter, the same
state of facts will make an assault if no killing ensues," 22 seems to be the correct
rule for the solution of negligent assault and battery cases.
In the above case, the prosecutor was not thrown out of his car or touched
in any way by the defendant's car, but was injured by reason of the severe jar.
This is none the less a battery, for the force applied unlawfully need not be direct,
but a battery is any unlawful touching of the person of another, irrespective of
the number of mechanical agencies through which it is transmitted. Thus to
strike a horse driven by the prosecutor or to strike the prosecutor's clothes may
be as much a battery as to strike his face.23 The indictment in this case was for
assault with deadly weapon. It is clear that an automobile may be a deadly weapon,
for whether a weapon is deadly or not depends upon such things as its size and
character, the manner of its use, the position of the parties, and other circum-
stances.
24
When the verdict was rendered, in the principal case, the defendant was sen-
tence'd to twelve months in jail and assigned to the roads. The ney't day, when
1o State v. Suddercth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828.
20C. S. sec. 2618, as amended by ch. 98, Public Laws, Extra Session 1921, as follows: "No person
shall operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state recklessly, or at a rate of speed greater
than is reasonably and proper, having regard to the width, traffic, an4 use of the highway, or so as to
endanger the property or the life or limb of any person; provided, that a rate of speed in excess of twcnty
miles per hour in the residence portion of any city, town or village, and a rate of speed in excess of ten
miles per hour in any business portion of a city, town or village and a rate in excess of thirty miles on
any public highway outside the corporate limits of any incorporated city or town, shall be deemed a violation
of this section."
so 1 N. C. L. Rev. 192, cited in note 8, supra.
= See cases in note 15, supra.
2aState v. Suddereth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828.
21 State v. Beal (1915) 170 N. C. 764, 87 S. E. 416.
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the motion for a new trial was made and overruled and appeal taken, the court
struck out the first judgment and imposed a sentence of two years. The Supreme
Court thought that the consideration for the imposition of the lighter sentence was
the fact that, as the lower court inferred, no further resistance was intended.
Judge Hoke said: "It is the accepted rule with us that within the limits of the
sentence permitted by the law, the character and extent of the punishment is com-
mitted tp the sound discretion of the trial court and may be reviewed by this court
only in case of manifest and gross abuse. While the reasons for this change of
sentence, and such a pronounced change, may not appear adequate or altogether
satisfactory, we do not feel justified in holding as a conclusion of law that the
judgment is erroneous within the meaning of the principle."2 5
In general, the judgments of a court are under its control during the term at
which they are made, so that a court has power, during a term, to correct, modify
or recall an unexecuted judgment in a criminal as well as in a civil case.2 6 Thus a
court may modify a sentence, eight days after it was begun, by reducing it from
twelve months to six months imprisonment.2 Whether a court has the power to
modify a sentence by increasing it is another matter. It seems that it will be al-
lowed if the trial court acted from right and proper motives, in order to make the
punishment fit the offense. In Nichols v. United States,2 8 the lower court under-
stood from counsel that the case would not be further prosecuted and so gave a
sentence of six months in jail. Thereupon counsel said that he intended to appeal,
and the court increased the sentence to twelve months. The Circuit Court of
Appeals thought that it was competent for the court to reconsider its sentence and
impose a different one. The court said, "The bill of exceptions does not show
that the first sentence was set aside and the second imposed, doubling the imprison-
ment, because the defendant had declared his intention of appealing the case. A
new sentence, with enhanced punishment, based upon such a reason, would be a
flagrant violation of the rights of the defendant. It would be the infliction of a
penalty for the exercise of a clear legal right and would call for the severest
censure. But no such motive can be imputed to the court below." A Georgia case
has reached the same result of refusing to reverse the judgment of a trial court,
but condemning the practice of increasing a sentence because the defendant ap-
peals.2  In both of these cases, the appellate courts presumed that the lower court
acted from right and proper motives. In the principal case, the lower court in-
creased the sentence, because the first sentence was given under the inference that
no further resistance was to be made by the defendant, and when further resistance
was made by exercising the constitutional right of appeal, the sentence was doubled.
It seems that this is a dangerous practice, and the North Carolina Supreme Court
would have done well to put a stop to it by reversing the judgment. Although the
21 State v. Suddereth (1922) 184 N. C. 753, 114 S. E. 828.
"Ex parte Lange (U. S. 1873) 18 Wall. 163, 21 L. Ed. 872; State v. Warren (1885) 92 N. C. 825;
.in re Brittain (1885) 93 N. C. 587.
21 In re Brittain (1885) 93 N. C. 587.
2s Nichols v. U. S. (1901) 106 Fed. 672, 46 C. C. A. 405.
"Meader$ v. State (1895) 96 Ga. 299, 22 S. E. 527.
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presumptions are in favor of the trial court, which will be upheld, if its action is at
all reasonable, it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to double a sentence be-
cause the defendant decides to appeal.
R. H. W.
FORMAL LIMITATIONS UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA-The
Constitution of North Carolina contains two provisions requiring certain formal
statements to appear in enacted laws. One is found in section 21 of article 2, pro-
viding that "The style of the acts shall be: The General Assembly of North Caro-
lina do enact." The other, located in section 7 of article 5, is that "Every act of
the General Assembly levying a tax shall state the special object to which it is to be
applied and it shall be applied to no other purpose."
The provision first quoted made its initial appearance in North Carolina in
the Constitution of 1868. The earlier constitutions in this state did not have a
similar requirement. That was true, also, of the federal Constitution, and of the
constitutions of Delaware (1897), Georgia (1877), Kentucky (1890), Pennsyl-
vania (1873), and Virginia (1902).' Kentucky has since inserted such a provis-
ion in her Constitution.2 In the absence of constitutional provision, statutes, cus-
tom, and legislative rules have covered the matter.3 Irregularity of phraseology,
or entire omission of the clause, in such a case, therefore, cannot usually affect
the validity of the act. But where the Constitution stipulates the insertion and
form of the enacting clause, exactness is not only advisable; it is often imperative.
For the draftsman of a legislative bill to .fail to comply with the constitutional re-
quirement, in full, is to fly in the face of disaster.
The decisions about the country are in conflict as to the precise effect of this
constitutional requirement. In some states it is held to be directory only, at least
to the extent that variation in language will not invalidate the law. In others, the
courts have held that the form prescribed in the basic law must be followed liter-
ally. Moreover, "the decisions vary all the way from holding that entire absence
of enacting provisions does not destroy the law even where there is an expressed
constitutional form, to the contention that a law without an enacting clause is void
although there be no constitutional provisions requiring it."'4
The matter seems to have been passed upon only once in North Carolina. In
State v. Patterson,8 decided in 1887, it appeared that the statute under which the
defendant had been indicted for a violation of a prohibition regulation contained
no enacting clause whatever. The present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
then a judge of the Superior Court, Clark, J., held that the statute was valid, not-
withstanding. The Supreme Court, however, per Merriman, J., reversed the judg-
ment, and held that the constitutional provision is mandatory and must be com-
1 For the various constituitonal provisions, see Index-Digest of State Constitutions, New York, 1915,
pages 832.
Sec. 62.
- The fullest discussion of the whole situation is found in Jones Statute Law Making, Boston, 1912,
pp. 81-90. See also Notes on Bill.drafting in Illinois, Springfield, 1926.
4 The cases are collected in Jones, Statute Law Idaking, note 3, supra.
'08 N. C. 660, 4 S. E. 350.
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plied with, saying: "The purpose [was] to require every legislative act of the
legislature to purport and import upon its face to have been enacted by the Gen-
eral Assembly . . . to establish the act, to give it permanence, uniformity and
certainty, to identify the act of legislation as of the General Assembly, to afford
evidence of its legislative, statutory nature." While the point was not before the
court, one gathers that a substantial variation from the language set forth in the
Constitution, had some sort of an enacting clause been used, would have met with
a similar judicial disapproval.
The second provision quoted at the beginning of this note, that "Every act of
the General Assembly levying a tax shall state the special object to which it is to
be applied and it shall be applied to no other purpose," has given rise to little trotible
with the validity of laws. It has figured mainly in connection with the question as
to how far the fiscal officers of the local government might go in spending the pro-
ceeds of taxation for a purpose not mentioned in the tax levy statute. It has been
held, however, that the clause is not a limitation upon tax levies enacted by other
legislative bodies than the General Assembly.6 Thus, it is not necessary for an
order of the county commissioners to specify the particular purposes for which gen-
eral taxes are levied. But it does apply to all acts of the state legislature levying
any kind of tax, whether upon the poll or upon property.7 And it has been gener-
ally held that any attempt to divert funds derived from taxation to a purpose differ-
ent from that specified in the legislative act violates the section quoted and is void.8
In this connection, the recent case of Parker v. Cornrs.9 is of interest. By
an act of the General Assembly, the commissioners of Johnson county were author-
ized to levy and collect a special tax from a part of the property owners of the
county for the purpose of erecting and maintaining a stock fence. The whole of
Johnson county having later been placed under a general stock law by legislative
enactment, the necessity for the continuance of the fence had ceased. Thereupon
the legislature provided that the county commissioners should sell the fence, and
that the proceeds of the sale, together with any balance on hand, should be paid
into the school fund of the county. The Supreme Court held, per Clark, C. J., that
this statute was valid. It relied mainly upon the earlier case of Long v. Commrs.'0
This case seems distinguishable upon the ground that the tax involved was one
levied by the county commissioners for a necessary purpose, a levy that did not
require special legislative approval, and whose purposes were not required to be
stated. In other words, the tax proceeds in the Long case could be diverted because
the Constitution did not require that they be spent for a particular stated purpose.
The Parker case gave judicial approval to a diversion from the initial purpose of
the tax, as originally stated, but a diversion authorized by the legislature itself. Jus-
tice Walker's dissent did not proceed upon the constitutional grounds here discussed.
a Parker v. Commrs. (1889) 104 N. C. 166, 10 S. E. 137.
' Bd. Education v. Commrs. (1904) 137 N. C. 310, 49 S. E. 353. Compare Railroad v. Commrs. (1908)
148 N. C. 220, 245, 61 S. E. 690.
.,rCcless v. Meekins (1895) 117 N. C. 35, 23 S. E., 99; and cases cited note 7, supra.
9 (1919) 178 N. C. 92, 100 S. E. 244.
1o (1877) 76 N. C. 273.
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The effect of the Parker case is to suggest that, while article 5, section 7 prevents
an application of the funds derived from taxation to a purpose distinct from that
specified by the legislature in the original tax authorization, the legislature itself
in a later act may validly permit such a diversion. Such a doctrine had theretofore
been expressly denied. 1
D. C. B.
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES IN NORTH CAROLINA-The power of a court of equity
to enforce negative restrictions imposed by agreement upon the use of property
has long been established. The principles controlling the exercise of this power
were originally thought to be those underlying the specific performance of con-
tracts. Current English authorities, however, and to a large extent, the more re-
cent American decisions, regard these agreements as creating equitable property
rights in another's property.' According to this view, they constitute "a sort of
equitable appendix to the common law servitudes" of easements, profits, and cove-
nants running with the land, and are properly called "equitable servitudes."'2
This jurisdiction of the chancellor seems to have been developed largely be-
cause of the failure of the common law to. create the rights in another's land made
necessary by modern social and economic conditions, and also because of the al-
most total lack of governmental supervision of buildings, at the time, in Anglo-
American countries. 3
The shift from the contract theory to the property theory has produced im-
portant consequences. According to the first conception, relief was granted or
denied after a discretionary consideration of the balance of hardships and con-
veniences between the parties. Under the property theory, the existence, nature,
extent and duration of the rights resulting from the agreement depend primarily
upon the intention of the original parties. If this intention was that the benefits
of a restricted use of a piece of property should inure to the ownership of another
piece of property, while a given relation between those properties exists, the rights
to those benefits pass, without express assignment, with the property to which they
are appurtenant. Moreover, persons subsequently taking the property, whose use
is so restricted, having either actual or constructive notice of the outstanding
rights, hold subject thereto. Therefore, while the original purpose can still be
carried out, the refusal of a chancellor to enforce those rights, merely because of
a discretionary sense that compliance with the restrictions would be inequitable as
between the present parties, would amount to a taking of property, without the
consent of the owner for the unentitled use of another. 4
Perhaps the most familiar cases of equitable servitudes are those in which
restrictions have been imposed upon the use of land for the benefit of the persons
t MLcCless v. Meckins, note 8, supra.
I See Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-19, Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 813, 929, at pp. 813.822;
Clark, Equitable Servitudes, 16 Rich. L. Rev. 90. For an apparent intimation of the comtract thcory, see
St. Peter's Church v. Brogaw (1907) 144 N. C. 126, 133, 56 S. E. 688, note 17, pst.
31 H-Iarv. L. Rev. 876, 877" Gil ford County v. Porter (1914) 167 N. C. 366, 370, 83 S. E. 564.
See Clark, Equitable Servitudes note , supra; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 201.
' Riverbank I,nprovenmeut Co. v. Chaduiec (1917) 228 Mlass. 243. 117 N. E. 244, discussed in 31 Harv.
L. Rev. 876. To the same effect,- Guilford County v. Porter, note 2, supra.
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who are to use another piece of land. Thus residents of an exclusive neighbor-
hood have been protected against the disruption of building lines,5 and against
the invasion of commercial establishments, 0 apartment or tenement buildings,7
and other obnoxious conditions.8 It is also true that the notion of equitable ser-
vitudes was largely developed in connection with the protection of interests in
real property.
Nevertheless, there is nothing in the conception of an equitable servitude to
prevent its applicability to the use of properties other than land. Two chattels
may have such a relation to each other that compliance with negative restrictions
upon the use of one will enlarge and preserve the enjoyment of the other.9 Simi-
larly, the ownership of a business may be benefited, not only by compliance with
negative restrictions upon the use of a chattel, but by the restricted use of a piece
of land10 or of another business."' If this was the intention of the parties, there
seems to be no reason why equity should not lend its coercive powers to an en-
forcement of such servitudes, as between those claiming under the original parties,
with notice. This assertion assumes, of course, the absence of conflict with a
countervailing public policy such as that prohibitive of unreasonable restraint of
trade.'12 Certainly the economic happiness of the owner of a business, whose good
will, trade relations, and labor problems constitute such vulnerable objectives for
disturbing conditions and influences, is as deserving of equity's solicitude as the
aesthetic contentment of the owner of a home.
The problem of equitable servitudes has been dealt with by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in connection with some three types of cases. The first type to
be noticed is the situation in which an owner of property has subdivided it and
laid out streets and alleys, selling lots in relation to the entire announced plan. In
spite of a failure to carry through a formal dedication of the streets and alleys to
the municipal corporation, it has been held that the purchasers of lots may be pro-
tected against their abandonment by conceiving of the owner's conduct as giving
rise to an estoppel to deny a dedication. 13
A second situation is found in the Guilford county courthouse property liti-
gation. In 1873, pursuant to statutory authority, the county purchased three lots
from Porter, Caldwell, and Staples, respectively, among others, for the purpose
of enlarging the court house square. In two of these conveyances, the county
covenanted "that the said lots herein conveyed shall be used by the parties of the
5Manners v. Johnson (1875) L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 673; Brandenburg v. Lager (1916) 272 II. 622, 112
N. E. 321; Withers v. Ward (1920) 86 W. Va. 558. 104 S. E. 96.
'Parker v. N Whtingale (Mass. 1863) 6 Allen 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632; Trustees of Columbia College v.
Lynch (1877) 70 14. Y. 440.
7 See the cases collected in 41 L. R. A. (n. s.) 625, 1 B. R. C. 993, and L. R. A. 1918 C 873.
8Robinson v. Edgell (1905) 57 NV. Va. 157, 49 S. E. 1027; and cases collected in 9 L. R. A. (n. s.)
1039. Compare Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux (1915) 136 Lou. 724, 67 So. 641; Gandolfo v. Hartnan(1892) 49 Fed. 181.
9Murphy v. Christian Press Co. (1889) 38 N. Y. App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y. S. 597; New York Bank
Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Co. (1895) 28 N. Y. App. Div. 411, 50 N. Y. 5. 1093. See 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 278.
10 Abergarw BrewU. Co. v. Holmes (1900) L. R. 1 Ch. 188; Rubel Bros. v. Dumont Co. (1920) 110
Misc. 32, 180 N. Y. S. 662.
11 Wilkes v. Spooner (1910) 24 L. T. R. 157, (1911) 2 K. B. 473; Cole v. Seamonds (1920) 87 W. Va.
19, 104 S. E. 747. See 27 W. Va. L. Quart. 259, and 24 Harv. L. Rev. 574.
12P. Lorillard Co. v. Weingarden (1922) 280 Fed. 238,.discussed in 36 Harv. L. Rev. 107.m
sSexton v. Elicabeth City (1915) 169 N. C. 385, 86 S. E. 344; Stevens Co. v. Myers Park Homes Co.
(1921) 181 N. C. 335, 107 S" E. 233.
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second part [the county] as a public square, and be forever kept open for that
purpose, and should any building or structure of any character inconsistent with
said purpose be erected thereon, the said party of the first part [the grantor], his
heirs and assigns, may enter upon the land herein conveyed and abate and remove
any and all buildings or parts of buildings inconsistent with this use." The third
deed, from Staples, contained no restriction, but a deed executed on the same
day conveying to Staples an adjoining lot as partial consideration for his tract,
did impose a substantially similar restriction upon the use of the lot acquired by
the .ounty. Subsequently, in 1911, the Staples lot, for the benefit of which the
restriction in the deed to Staples had been imposed, was sold back to the county
through mesne conveyances. In 1873, Porter owned land adjoining the public
square which was intended to be benefited by the restriction in his deed. Appar-
ently Caldwell did not, but on the same day that Caldwell conveyed his lot to the
county, the county conveyed to him a tract of land adjoining this lot and the court
house square. In this deed, no mention was made of the restrictive covenant. Dur-
ing the next year, Caldwell sold off the tract received from the county, to various
persons, in separate lots, the conveyances not mentioning the restrictions imposed
upon the property held by the county. And Porter, at about the same time, simi-
larly conveyed the tract adjoining the court house square owned by him at the
time the restrictive covenants were exacted from the county. Later, Porter and
Caldwell both died intestate.
In 1914, the county having purchased a new court house site several blocks
distant, proposed to sell the old court house square to a private corporation which
planned to erect thereon a modern office building. In an action by the county and
the proposed purchaser against the heirs and assignees of Porter and Caldwell, to
quiet title to the property in question, the Supreme Court first held 14 that the cove-
nants in the deeds from Porter and Caldwell to the county constituted equitable
servitudes which both the heirs and the assignees of the original dominant owners
could enforce by injunction. Later, in the course of four successive appeals, 10 the
court held, per Clark, C. J., that the right to the enforcement of the restrictions
did not pass to the assignees of the parcels composing the original dominant estate,
and that the most the heirs could do would be to enter and tear down the portion of
the building standing upon the Porter and Caldwell tracts. After the first appeal,
however, the proposed purchaser of the square had bought out the heirs. The
Chief Justice, in overruling the decision reached on the first appeal, did not acknowl-
edge that the court was doing so. Regardless of the effect of the later decisions
upon the commercial development of Greensboro, they constitute unfortunate steps
in the delineation of the North Carolina law of equitable servitudes. The 1914
opinion of Judge Brown is a clear and vigorous statement of the true view. The
basic test as to whQ is entitled to enforce equitable servitudes is the intention of
14 Guilford County v. Porter (1914) 167 N. C. 366, 83 S. E. 564.
isGuilford County v. Porter (1915) 170 N. C. 310, 87 S. E. 252; (1916) 171 N. C. 356, 88 S. E. 855;
Guilford County v. ffption (1921) 181 N. C. 288, 107 S. E. 8. See also Barker v. Insurance Co. (1921)
1s1 N. C. 267, 268, 107 S. E. 11.
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the original "parties.'0 From the language of the covenants and the relationship
of the lots involved, it is obvious that this intention was to benefit the Porter and
Caldwell tracts adjoining the court house square into whosoever hands they might
come. There were no facts or words indicating that it was the intention to benefit
these lots only while held by the original covenantees. No formalities were re-
quired to pass to the assignees of the dominant estate the right to the continued
use of the servient estate as a court house square. It was enough that the lots,
opening onto that square, would have no value otherwise.
The third general situation in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina
has discussed the doctrine of equitable servitudes is that in which a purchaser of
land has resisted performance of the contract on the ground that the existence of
various restrictive agreements concerning tle use of the land constituted a defect
in the vendor's title. The first ctse of this type was that of St. Peter's Church
v. Bragaw,17 arising in 1907. Two lots had been granted to a church, in 1886, on
condition, inter alia, that the property should never be used as a cemetery. More
than twenty years later, the church contracted to sell a part of the lots to Bragaw,
probably as a site for a residence, and purposed to use the remainder as a site
for a rectory.' In a controversy without action to settle the title, Walker, J., after
disposing of the issues raised by the parties, suggested that:
"The covenant against using the premises as a cemetery will bind the grantee of the
original covenantor with notice and be enforced in equity against him; and in order to fix him
with liability, it is not necessary that the covenant should be one technically attaching to and
concerning the land, and so running with the title and binding those who succeed to it, the
question being, not whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a party shall be
permitted to use the land inconsistently with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with
notice of which he purchased.. Each case, of course, will depend upon its own circum-
stances, and the covenant will be enforced by the court, or its enforcement refused, as the
nature of the particular case may, under the general principles of equity, seem to require."
While entirely sound in other respects, this intimation that the enforcement of
such restrictions depends merely upon a particular chancellor's discretionary view
of the balance of equities between the parties does not compare favorably with the
property theory as later announced in the first case of Guilford County v. Porter,
supra.
The two recent cases of Myers Park Homes Co. v. Falls,'8 decided in 1922,
and of Snyder v. Heath,19 decided in April, 1923, went off primarily upon ques-
tions as to the extent of the dominant estate, that is, the property benefited by the
particular restrictive covenants. In each case, a purchaser had refused to go
through with his contract, on the ground that the title of his grantor was defective
in that equitable servitudes affecting the property had not been released by all of
the parties entitled to their maintenance. In the first case, the court was enabled
by an agreed statement of facts and by a prior adjudication20 in relation to the
See Clark, Equity (1919) sec. 98, and cases cited.
5' 144 N. C. 126, 133, 56 S. E. 688. The principal points at issue related to adverse possession and the
rights of two heirs who had not joined in the deed to the church in 1886, and to the question as to whether
the sale to Bragaw would be an "abandonment" of the property so as to invoke a reversion to the grantors'
heirs, in accordance with the original deed to the church.
184 N. C. 426, 115 S. E. 184.
117 S. E. 294.
2OStcphenr Co. v. Myers Park Homes Co. (1921) 181 N. C. 335, 107 S. E. 233.
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general situation, to hold that an 1100 acre tract had not been developed as a single
unit, but that each block had been improved and the- lots comprising it sold as an
isolated subdivision, as a result of which releases executed by all of the property
owners within the particular block to which the locus in quo belonged were held
sufficient. In the second case, three considerations caused the court to decide
against the purchaser's contentions. In the first place, the vendor's grantor had
apparently expressly reserved to itself the privilege of enforcing the restrictions in
question. And it had now released the property from the servitude. In the second
place, the lot in question was the only one in its block or within the immediate
vicinity which had been sold subject to restrictions. Other lots in the original de-
velopment which had been sold with restrictive covenants were at some little dis-
tance. And in the third place, the immediate vicinity had already changed from a
residence to a commercial neighborhood, so that restrictions relating to the pre-
servation of residence characteristics might be said to have lapsed.
L. T. H.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW represents the fourth attempt to estab-
lish in this state a legal periodical of particular interest to North Carolina judges
and lawyers. The first was The Carolina Law Repository. This ran into
two volumes between 1813 and 1816. Who its editor was does not appear. It
was printed in Raleigh by Joseph Gales. The second was The North Carolina Law
Journal. This also ran into two volumes from 1900 to 1902. It was edited by
Paul Jones, of Tarboro. While conducted as a private enterprise, it was spon-
sored by the North Carolina Bar Association.' That body, however, did not as-
sume any financial responsibility. In 1904, largely through the efforts of the Bar
Association, the Law Journal was revived under the name of the North Carolina
Journal of Law. The Bar Association contributed toward the financial support
of this Journal and made it the Association's official organ.2 It was edited by
Judge James C. McRae, then Dean of the School of Law of the University of
North Carolina. After the completion of two volumes, however, Judge McRae
was compelled to give up the work, in December, 1905, because of the pressure
of his work as Dean, and the Journal ceased publication.
Each of these three periodicals contained a number of articles and editorials
of permanent value to students of North Carolina law. The REVIEW will there-
fore prepare a cumulative index to the more valuable material found in these six
volumes, and publish it together with the index to volume one of the REvIEw.
The North Carolina Collection, in the University library, contains a complete file
of all of the periodicals mentioned, except number twelve of volume two of the
North Carolina Law Journal, dated April, 1902. Anyone having a copy of that
number will facilitate the preparation of a complete index if he will send it to the
editors of this REvIEw at once.
IFor various statements indicating the relationship between the Journal and the Bar Association, see I
Reports, North Carolina Bar Association, 46-56, 121, and 2 ibid. 8-9. A committee composed oft C. W.
Tillett W A Guthrie and H. A. London represented the Bar Association.
2See 5 Reports korth Carolina Bar Association, 43, 50, 174. The Bar Association committee was
composed of C. W. Tillett, E. W. Timberlake, and J. Crawford Biggs. The subsidy amounted to $300 for
one year. See 6 Reports, 53, 65, and 7 ibid. 58.
